Raid of the UPA Group “Lysonya” Detachment to Volyn According to NKVD Troops Documents

The detachment of the “Lysonya” group under the command of Omelyan Polovyi-“Ostap Shukhai” existed for only a month. However, it participated in heavy battles with subdivisions of three different Internal Troops NKVD units. Historians know many insurgent sources about the combat path of this formation. But reporting from the Internal Troops NKVD Ukrainian District Archive significantly supplements and corrects the picture of battles. How Ukrainian partisans waged trench warfare, resisted tanks and cavalry, and what Pushkin has to do with it – read on.

Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire

In the first days of September 1944, in forests on the border of Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk) and Ternopil oblasts stood a newly formed kurin under the command of khorunzhyi Omelyan Polovyi-“Ostap” (“Shukhai”). “Ostap” held the position of commander of the “Lysonya” military district (VO) of UPA-West. The VO’s subdivisions had crossed the German-Soviet front line a month earlier, not without obstacles, and were in the process of reorganization. Thus, under “Ostap’s” command found themselves the companies “Lisovyky” (commander Ivan Yukhnovych-“Kok”), “Chornomortsi” (commander “Zhuk”), and several training detachments. With the kurin was also the military district’s non-commissioned officer school under the command of Vasyl Hladun-“Chos.”

In the forests between the villages of Sloviatyn, Lypytsia Dolishnia, and Lypytsia Horishnia (now Nyzhnia Lypytsia and Verkhnia Lypytsia), the NKVD troops already had agent data about the presence of “large bandit formations” and planned a major Chekist-military operation. During September 5-7, “Ostap’s” kurin together with the neighboring kurin of khorunzhyi Volodymyr Yakubovskyi-“Bondarenko” (chief of staff of VO “Lysonya”) withstood several heavy all-day battles and retreated toward Molokhov to avoid complete encirclement.

On the night of September 8, both kurins moved to a small forest near the village of Vilkhovets, Berezhany District, Ternopil Oblast. Having resolved the issue of treating the wounded, the insurgents headed to the village of Vulka (now Volytsia), where they stopped for several days.

In the adjacent forests, the kurins of “Ostap” and “Bondarenko” united into a single formation (“detachment of the ‘Lysonya’ group”) under the command of Omelyan Polovyi-“Ostap.” Now under “Ostap’s” command, in addition to his own, were the companies “Buini” of Petro Rak-“Ovoch,” “Kholodnyartsi” of Bohdan Fedyk-“Kruk,” and “Rubachi” under the command of Hryhorii Kovalchuk-“Voron” from “Bondarenko’s” kurin, as well as the newly created company “Rybolovtsi” of Oleksii Shnitser-“Mech.” From the military district headquarters workers who were with Polovyi, they formed the new detachment headquarters. He could communicate with kurins and companies by radio thanks to the presence of radio operators, which was very rare for the UPA. Of heavy weapons, the subdivisions had several mortars, Panzerfausts, anti-tank rifles (PTR), and at least two anti-tank guns.

Omelyan Polovyi received the task to “regenerate the terrain and moods in the new reality (front and longer-term rear-front Podillian strip), demoralize the enemy with a blow of quantity and test the tactics of force grouping.” On September 14, the “Lysonya” group detachment began executing the order, setting out on a raid to Southern Volyn.

Victory Near Poruchyn

On September 16, the detachment stopped to rest near a hamlet north of the village of Poruchyn, Berezhany District. The next morning around 8:00-9:00 a.m., a company of NKVD troops unexpectedly attacked the outposts from the direction of Volytsia village. From documents in the Internal Troops NKVD Ukrainian District Archive, we learn that this was the 3rd Rifle Company of the 187th Separate Rifle Battalion (OSB) of the 18th Rifle Brigade (SBr). The blow fell on one of the weakest detachments – a platoon of the “Chornomortsi” company. Its riflemen didn’t hold – and the enemy broke through to the “Kholodnyartsi” camp. At the alarm signal, other detachments of the unit instantly took combat positions and went on the counteroffensive.

The “Kholodnyartsi” and “Rubachi” companies opened fire; the Reds retreated and fortified themselves in a ravine, where they took cover from insurgent mortars. At the same time, their commander sent 50-60 men to the UPA fighters’ flank to catch them in pincers from the Poruchyn side.

This group ran into the “Buini” company, which repelled the attackers and with the cry “Slava!” went on the counterattack. Having retreated, the Internal Troops subdivision together with the company’s main forces threw itself into attack again. But the “Kholodnyartsi” and “Chornomortsi” pushed the enemy from the forest into the field, where the “Rubachi” pulled up from the left side. The combined pressure of the companies together with accurate mortar fire caused the Reds’ flight.

In less than an hour, the 1st Company came to help the enemy’s first group from the south, from the direction of Berezhany – about 150 soldiers with three mortars and anti-aircraft gun (according to other data, they had cannons). They dismounted from vehicles and began heavily shelling the positions of “Shukhai’s” detachment on farmsteads and in the forest. The Chekists also led an offensive on Poruchyn, where a platoon of “Hordii” from the “Buini” company was defending, setting houses on fire with incendiary bullets.

The situation began to intensify, but commander “Ovoch” led the main forces of the “Buini” company in a desperate attack under a hail of enemy mortars. At the same time, accurate fire from the insurgent mortar destroyed one NKVD mortar and brought confusion to the Red commanders’ ranks. From the other flank, the “Lisovyky” went on the attack – and under crossfire the enemy began fleeing to their vehicles.

The Chekists were pursued to the village of Bishche, where the “Lisovyky” freed about 150 villagers whom the Bolsheviks had earlier arrested around the surrounding villages (possibly these were designated for deportation).

As a result of the battle, the insurgents claimed significant successes: three machine guns, several submachine guns, and many rifles, medicines, clothing, and other trophies fell into their hands. NKVD losses, according to various UPA reports, ranged from 86 to as many as 105-165 killed. Insurgent losses – three killed, seven wounded (of whom one later died).

For their part, 187th Battalion commander Captain Makarov, with officers drew up a document stating that during an 11-hour battle with a “gang” of 800 people, the battalion allegedly destroyed 303 insurgents, as established by “actual count of corpses.” The battalion’s losses (of which 250 soldiers participated in the battle), indicated in operational report No. 0022 of the 18th Rifle Brigade headquarters, were 12 killed, 17 wounded, and 1 missing. All are listed by name – therefore, this is the true number of Internal Troops losses.

Cavalry-Tank Attack

Having buried their three fallen near the Zaluzhzhia hamlet, “Shukhai’s” detachment gathered, divided food, and set off on the road at night. The path ran through the village of Vitsyn (now Smerekivka of Peremyshliany hromada) of Lviv Oblast, a small forest near Prysivtsi (now Zboriv hromada of Ternopil District), the village of Zvyzhen (now Pidkamin hromada of Zolochiv District) of Lviv Oblast.

On the morning of the 23rd, the detachment quartered on the Ivantsi farmstead near the village of Lopushne, Pochaiv (now Kremenets) District of Ternopil Oblast. The terrain was flat, sparsely forested – unfavorable for defense, but the detachment, exhausted by previous marches, remained to rest. The day passed quietly, and detachment commander “Ostap” decided not to change the camp location. But on September 24 around 2:00-3:00 p.m., reconnaissance reported that significant Internal Troops NKVD forces were concentrating nearby.

The UPA detachment headquarters believed that three companies of infantry, half a company of cavalry, a tank and three tankettes supported by mortars and anti-aircraft gun were operating against it. Two aircraft circled over the insurgents from the air. Internal Troops NKVD documents confirm that the 4th saber squadron of the 18th Cavalry Regiment (108 men) and two tanks under the leadership of regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Zakharchenko participated in the battle. The Pochaiv and Chervonoarmiisk (Radyvyliv) NKVD district departments set up barriers to the northeast of the battle site in case the insurgents retreated in that direction.

At 4:00 p.m., insurgent outposts located from the direction of Lopushne and Pochaiv were attacked by two reconnaissance-search groups of 40 sabers each. One of them engaged in battle with insurgent sentries west of Ivantsi, and the second, hearing gunfire, came to the UPA fighters’ rear. From incendiary shells and bullets, houses caught fire, which caused lamentation and dissatisfaction among villagers.

The main blow was taken by the companies “Lisovyky,” “Chornomortsi,” and “Kholodnyartsi.” The remaining subdivisions took up circular defense, guarding the supply train in a nearby forest. Meanwhile, the “Rybolovtsi” company received orders to advance through Ivantsi in the direction of Lopushne village. But on the northern part of the hamlet, the advance had to be stopped and the company had to lie down, because it came under heavy fire.

“To stop the advance of the ‘Rybolovtsi,'” relates candidate of historical sciences Serhii Volianiuk, “the squadron commander ordered the heavy machine gun operator to take a firing position on the eastern edge of Ivantsi hamlet, setting the task of not allowing the company to exit eastward to Lopushne, and the mortar platoon commander – from positions southwest of the same hamlet to open fire on the insurgent company advancing on this village.”

Under fire, the company rolled back and lay down in a ditch, where it continued fighting until evening.

The 4th squadron commander allocated a machine gun tachanka from the machine gun platoon for the second group, and he, himself, with the machine gun and mortar platoons, hurried to help the first group, which continued fighting west of the hamlet.

Around 5:00 p.m., the NKVD squadron launched a strong offensive. The Bolsheviks shelled the supply trains with mortars and cannons, trying to break through to the insurgents’ rear. Omelyan Polovyi ordered the supply train to withdraw in the direction of the city of Pidkamin, Lviv Oblast, where the encirclement ring had not yet closed. But when the supply train moved about 500 meters away, enemy tanks attacked it. The wagons turned around and headed to the forest, where the crew abandoned the carts in the bushes and retreated to the eastern projection of Chornyi Lis village – Kholodne (Kholodzhiany) hamlet.

The Soviet report “Defeat of Shukhai’s Gang,” quoted by S. Volianiuk, described the attempt to use a UPA cannon against one of the armored vehicles: “At 6:00 p.m., the regiment commander sent a staff officer by tank through Kholodzhiany to the 4th squadron commander… in Kholodzhiany [the machine crew noticed] small groups and individual insurgents withdrawing through gardens and vegetable gardens to the west. Fire was opened on the insurgents from the tank cannon, machine gun, and submachine guns. At this time, the tank commander noticed five insurgents aiming an anti-tank gun at the tank. The gunner managed to fire at the target, but this did not harm the tank. The insurgents hid behind a fence, and the tank, moving forward, crushed the gun…”

As a result, the entire supply train was lost, but this episode, as documents testify, saved the main forces from complete encirclement, since the supply train drew the attention of NKVD tanks to itself.

The 18th Cavalry Regiment command ordered subdivisions to surround the forest exits, and in the north – in the area of Berezyna hamlet and Lidikhiv village of Pochaiv District (now Pochaiv hromada of Kremenets District) – placed a barrier from the 2nd squadron and anti-tank battery in case of an insurgent breakthrough attempt.

Despite the enemy’s numerical and technical superiority, the UPA detachments held positions until dusk. Then under cover of darkness and fog they gathered in a field in the area of Krutniv, Raslavka, Losiatyn, Berezyna, and Lidikhiv villages (between Pochaiv and Pidkamin) and moved south. The enemy could not pursue them because it lost orientation due to fires and darkness, and its forces were dispersed.

The “Buini” company’s attempt to return the supply train at night ended in a new battle: when the insurgents, quietly approaching the camp, began harnessing horses, a Red ambush opened machine gun fire. Confusion arose, two insurgents and several horses were killed.

Total UPA losses, according to its documents, were five killed (including platoon commander Oleksandr Fedyk-“Modest” from the “Chornomortsi” company) and seven wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Zakharchenko reported that his subordinates supposedly found 64 corpses and “many” fresh graves on the battlefield. The cavalrymen’s own losses were limited to four killed and the same number wounded. The Chekists captured: three mortars, 20 light machine guns, four PTRs, 71 rifles, three submachine guns, 1,200 grenades, 20 wagons, 40 horses, etc.

During the night, “Shukhai’s” detachment carried out a complex maneuver to exit the encirclement, often changing direction and passing through the same villages several times to confuse pursuers. Later it became known that the enemy mistakenly believed that the insurgents had retreated further to Volyn, so it moved in another direction. This allowed the UPA kurins to avoid a new skirmish.

Due to the loss of the supply train, headquarters documents, property, heavy weapons, and ammunition, the raid on the Kremenets region had to be interrupted.

“Pushkin” Against the Chekists

After long marches, “Shukhai’s” detachment reached the Albanivka (Halbanivka) hamlet near Nosivtsi village, Velykohlybochytskyi District (now Ternopil city hromada) on the morning of September 27. The insurgents were exhausted and soaked after the crossing; many settled in houses, dried clothes, and rested.

When the day before the detachment stood in the forest near Vertelka village, the Zaloztsi District NKVD Department learned about this. At midnight on September 27, the department head summoned from Vyshnivets a detachment of the 229th Battalion of the 21st Brigade under the command of Captain Sabadash, reinforced with two mortars and a heavy machine gun. Neither the district department nor battalion commander Sabadash had information about the number and armament of the UPA detachment. Therefore, it was decided that 65 Chekists would engage in battle with the insurgents, push them into open space and destroy them, while a barrier of NKVD district department workers and militiamen would not let them retreat to the forest.

However, they were late – “Shukhai’s” detachment had already managed to leave the camp location. Captain Sabadash decided to organize pursuit, engage in battle with the UPA fighters, and the district department head was to call for reinforcements from the battalion headquarters.

At 12:00 noon (according to UPA reports, the clock showed 10:00 a.m.), Sabadash’s detachment column approached from the direction of Neterpyntsi village, Zaloztsi District (now Zalozetska hromada) to the forest edge near Albanivka. The main guard noticed the insurgents’ movement, and to prevent them from preparing for battle, the battalion commander ordered an attack from the east. When the main guard under the command of Lieutenant Zaikin approached the hamlet to 60-70 meters, it was noticed by the “Lisovyky” company outpost, which opened fire.

“The first wagons, receiving fire, immediately stopped and few from them escaped. From other wagons traveling behind, the Bolsheviks jumped off and began shooting,” wrote the UPA report author.

The remaining “Lisovyky” and the “Kholodnyartsi” company took positions and entered battle. Zaikin’s men fortified themselves in old trenches – remnants of the German-Soviet front line.

“The Bolsheviks tried to advance, but this did not succeed for them and after losses they sat down again in the trenches. The battle dragged on,” reports “Description of Battles of UPA Detachments with NKVD Troops on Ternopil Oblast Territory.”

And from the chronicle of the “Kholodnyartsi” company it follows that “in order not to allow the enemy closer to the detachment’s positions, the ‘Kholodnyartsi’ and ‘Lisovyky’ companies went on the counteroffensive and began flanking the enemy. The offensive was quite strong, which threw the enemy back from its positions. A dozen or so Bolsheviks who did not manage to flee lay down in trenches and began shooting back.”

The insurgents occupied another trench line opposite the Chekists, and a frontal battle began. “This battle is characterized by the fact that the Bolsheviks, having fortified themselves in trenches, shot at our detachments all day rarely, but accurately and systematically,” we read in the chronicle of the “Buini” company. It was precisely from Soviet sniper fire that company commander “Kruk” was wounded, due to which the “Kholodnyartsi” offensive choked.

The main forces of the NKVD detachment, hearing gunfire, rushed to help their forward subdivision, since the battalion commander was with it. Having occupied height 386.0, north of Albanivka, the Chekists opened fire with machine guns and mortars on UPA positions, and 8 fighters led by junior lieutenant Yasennik hurried to the main guard. However, not reaching 200 meters, the group was forced to lie down under a shower of UPA machine gun bursts. Yasennik’s soldiers had nothing left but to occupy trenches and shoot back.

Evidently, it was precisely the appearance of the main forces of the 229th OSB detachment that the chronicle of the “Kholodnyartsi” company described: “Toward evening, reinforcements came to the Bolsheviks in the strength of one company. With them, they brought a small cannon (anti-aircraft gun), which, with direct fire, began hitting our line. Having received reinforcement, the Bolsheviks went on the offensive, but were forced to retreat to their positions. The mentioned “anti-aircraft gun” was most likely a Soviet large-caliber heavy machine gun.

Captain Sabadash understood that the insurgents’ forces were several times superior and decided to organize defense at height 386.0. He sent the second assistant chief of staff, Lieutenant Alekseev, for reinforcements to Zaloztsi.

Meanwhile, we read in the chronicle of the “Buini” company, “the rumble of grenade launchers [mortars] from both our and the enemy side did not subside, but had no positive result for either the Bolsheviks or us. It was hard for us to knock the Bolsheviks out of the trenches, because during an attempted offensive, many people fell, and the Bolsheviks, again, did not advance.”

The NKVD men established a fire system, thanks to which machine gunners, mortar men, and riflemen could effectively keep the significantly larger UPA forces at a distance. Thus ended unsuccessfully for the insurgents the first attempt to storm Sabadash’s positions through ravines from the northwest and northeast of Albanivka. In 20-30 minutes, the UPA fighters repeated the offensive again, and then several more times. And although the insurgents’ attacks were swift, they were not simultaneous, which allowed the Chekists to easily repel them.

Most UPA reports about the battle note the heroic behavior of a machine gunner – a native of Dnipro, Ukraine, with the unexpected pseudonym “Pushkin”: “He shot from a machine gun on the run, not paying attention to enemy bullets that had already wounded him several times. At last, having received a heavy wound in the stomach, he fell and continued shooting from the machine gun.” Only after having lost consciousness did the brave machine gunner release the weapon from his hands.

Commander Omelyan Polovyi-“Ostap” decided to strike at NKVD positions from all sides. 150-200 insurgents concentrated in a hollow northwest of Nosivtsi village, the same number of fighters – in a hollow south of Neterpyntsi; a third group of 100 people remained in a hollow west of height 336.0. On the flanks and on the northern forest edge east of Albanivka hamlet, they positioned heavy machine guns, mortars, and an anti-tank gun.

After a short fire raid, the insurgents surrounded the Chekists and time after time went on the offensive. But the Reds fought back fiercely.

– NKVD men, surrender, we’ll kill you all anyway! – the UPA fighters shouted.

– Bolsheviks don’t surrender to bandits as prisoners! – they heard in response.

But the real state of affairs in Captain Sabadash’s detachment at the end of the day was not at all so optimistic. “During the last attacks, the detachment’s situation was extremely difficult,” wrote brigade commander Colonel Myshko later, “since in the second hour of battle, one 82mm mortar was put out of action by a bandit mine explosion, only 4 mines remained for the second mortar, the fighters had 15-20 cartridges each, and for submachine guns cartridges were almost absent, and therefore the last attacks in some areas the fighters repelled with grenades.” All hopes were for the approach of reinforcements.

However, several factors saved the Chekists. In addition to mistakes in offensive tactics, “Shukhai’s” insurgents were forced to disperse forces, setting up cover in all directions, since they did not know when and from where help would come to the Reds.

At eight o’clock in the evening, the insurgents abandoned attempts to destroy Captain Sabadash’s detachment and under cover of darkness collected the wounded and part of the killed, weapons, and retreated to the initial position.

The 229th OSB detachment remained at positions until dawn, maintaining circular defense, until at 7:30 a.m. it awaited Colonel Myshko with subdivisions of the 230th Battalion. By that time, the insurgents had already managed to withdraw far enough, and the rain that poured for a whole day erased their tracks. Further Chekist searches were futile.

The exit from battle of the “Lysonya” group detachment was led by Volodymyr Yakubovskyi-“Bondarenko,” because commander Omelyan Polovyi received shrapnel wounds to the head, neck, and arm.

The question of losses, as always, is contradictory. According to UPA documents, the detachment’s total losses equaled 11 killed and 18 wounded. In particular, the “Kholodnyartsi” company lost six killed and six wounded (among them – company commander “Kruk” and platoon commander “Sokil”); the “Lisovyky” company – four killed (“Chuhay,” “Khmara,” “Lis,” “Pushkin”). The detachment headquarters estimated NKVD troops’ losses based on local population data in the range of 40 to 60 killed and wounded.

For their part, brigade commander Colonel Myshko in “Description of Chekist-Military Operation of 229th OSB Units of the 21st Rifle Brigade Near Neterpyntsi Village” claimed that as a result of an eight-hour battle, the UPA fighters lost 77 fighters killed, “who were counted on the battlefield.” And later the Zaloztsi District NKVD and NKGB Departments established that “the gangs in this battle lost up to 140 people killed and up to 170 wounded.”

At the same time, the Chekists captured as trophies only 12 rifles, one submachine gun, one light machine gun, a pistol, 30 hand grenades, and 3,000 cartridges (which generally coincides with the number of killed according to UPA documents). Myshko explained such a striking discrepancy by the fact that the insurgents, “using darkness and insufficient forces of our detachment, managed to pick up the wounded and part of the killed from the battlefield and take them with them, and also picked up a large amount of weapons they left on the battlefield.” In the brigade’s operational report, UPA losses are indicated as 50 killed and 70 wounded. And the 229th Battalion’s losses were only one killed and two wounded.

As we see, each side inflated the enemy’s losses in its reporting. More or less reliable can be considered their stated own losses: 11 killed and 18 wounded insurgents and, respectively, one and two Internal Troops NKVD soldiers. Although, in S. Volianiuk’s opinion, both NKVD and UPA underestimated their own losses.

If we sum up the number of insurgent losses cited by the NKVD men in three battles, it comes out to 507 killed and at least 170 wounded. But in Omelyan Polovyi’s entire detachment there were six companies, numbering from 100 to 180 warriors each, that is, a total of 700-1,000 people. So if we believe the Chekists’ reports, they irreversibly put out of action from 50% to over 70% of the UPA detachment’s personnel! Which is impossible to imagine.

Disbanding the Detachment

After the battle near Albanivka, the “Lysonya” group detachment went further south along the route: Servyry (now Syrovary) – Yatskivtsi – Mshana – Volosivka – Yarchivtsi, bypassing the city of Zboriv from the east. The path ran through minefields of the former front strip. The insurgents were led by a local resident who knew the safe path well.

Exhausted insurgents, moving continuously, often fell from fatigue and fell behind. Only in the forest near the village of Mala Plavucha (now Kozivska hromada of Ternopil District), which the detachment reached on September 28, was it possible to rest and pull themselves together. In two days, the “Lysonya” group detachment returned to the starting point – to the Sloviatyn forest massif. There was a ceremony of oath-taking by VO “Lysonya” subdivisions took place.

On October 5, 1944, according to the VO headquarters order, the detachment was disbanded, and the companies received separate assignments. And the wounded Omelyan Polovyi, until spring 1945, was treated at UPA medical points in Berezhany and Rohatyn OUN counties, and then moved to headquarters work in UPA-West command.

This article and the document collection was prepared and published within the framework of the project “Return Exported Archives: Digital Collection of Documents on the USSR’s Struggle Against the Ukrainian Liberation Movement,” implemented by the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement with support from the Nova Ukraine foundation and Ukrainian Cultural Foundation within the framework of the “Cultural Heritage” competition program. The position of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation may not coincide with the position of the project authors.

Source: History.Rayon