Among documents from the Internal Troops NKVD archive, particular attention should be paid to Volume No. 111 — “Reports on the State of Operational-Combat Activities and Combat Training in the District’s Units and Formations.” It contains summary reporting from military units that participated in suppressing the Ukrainian liberation movement. These papers provide comprehensive data on where and what the NKVD troops were doing and what results they achieved during the period from January to September 1945 — right up to the official end of World War II.

Documents from the USSR NKVD troops that fought the Ukrainian liberation movement are becoming increasingly accessible to researchers and all interested parties. This year, the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement expanded its collection of digitized documents from the Internal Troops NKVD Ukrainian District Archive, first published in 2021 on the Electronic Archive of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement website. The original archival documents are stored in Moscow, where they were taken from Kyiv in the 1980s. Now, the internet and modern technologies are returning these primary sources to Ukrainians.

The second part of the documents contains information about NKVD troops’ activities in 1945. These include plans and descriptions of Chekist-military operations against the UPA, reports on the combat activities results of each Internal Troops NKVD unit, documents about their participation in deportations of the civilian population, operational reports, intelligence summaries, combat orders, information about troop composition and deployment, their morale, and other documents comprehensively reflecting the functioning of the communist regime’s “punitive sword” in western Ukraine.

Among this series of documents from the Internal Troops NKVD archive, Volume No. 111 — “Reports on the State of Operational-Combat Activities and Combat Training in the District’s Units and Formations” — deserves primary attention. It contains summary reporting from military units that participated in suppressing the Ukrainian liberation movement. These papers provide comprehensive data on where and what the NKVD troops were doing and what results they achieved during the three quarters of 1945, from January to September — right up to the official end of World War II.

Therefore, I would recommend researchers begin studying the new Internal Troops NKVD documents with Volume 111. Starting from it, it will be convenient to move from the general to the specific — individual anti-insurgent operations or military unit reporting for shorter periods contained in other volumes.

From the volume’s materials, it emerges that throughout 1945, the struggle against “banditry” in Western Ukraine was conducted by 6 rifle brigades, 3 rifle regiments, and 1 cavalry regiment of the Internal Troops NKVD.

• The 16th Brigade under Colonel Klokov was responsible for liquidating insurgents in 8 districts of the northern part of Rivne Oblast, with its headquarters located in the city of Sarny.
• The 17th Brigade under Colonel Bromberg was deployed in Lviv and Drohobych oblasts and several adjacent districts of Stanislav Oblast.
• The 19th Brigade under Colonel Khazov conducted counter-insurgency operations in Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk) and Chernivtsi oblasts.
• The 20th Brigade under Colonel Kosonogov served Rivne Oblast, and in early April 1945 was redeployed to the northern districts of Ternopil Oblast: Kremenets, Pochaiv, Dederkalsk, Shumsk, Zaloztsi, Vyshnivets, and Lanivtsi districts.
• South of it, on the remaining territory of Ternopil Oblast, the 21st Brigade under Colonel Myshko operated.
• The 24th Brigade under Colonel Fateev covered 16 western and southern districts of Rivne Oblast: Kozynskyi, Chervonoarmiiskyi, Demydivskyi, Ostrozhets, Mlyniv, Dubno, Hoshcha, Ostroh, Mezhyrich, and Korets. It also guarded the Kovel railway.
• The 169th (Lieutenant Colonel Savchenko), 192nd (Lieutenant Colonel Solomakhin), and 277th (Lieutenant Colonel Zhdanov) regiments were scattered across Volyn Oblast. They had previously been part of the 9th (Ordzhonikidze) Rifle Division, which the Internal Troops NKVD Ukrainian District Administration disbanded in early 1945.
• Finally, the 18th Cavalry Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Zakharchenko operated in Pidkamin, Brody, Lopatyn, Ponykovychi, and Olesko districts of Lviv Oblast.

In each military unit’s report, one can find more detailed deployment plans for its subdivisions with specific settlements indicated. This makes it easier for researchers to establish which particular NKVD troops subdivision participated in a given operation in a certain locality.

Each report has roughly the same content: general characterization of the situation in the unit’s deployment areas; results of combat work and state of combat training for the reporting period; political-moral state of personnel (including military crimes and offenses); and information about the unit’s rear and economic support.

Colonel Myshko, for example, stated that the operational area districts of his 21st Brigade were 100% affected by “banditry.” “Because of this, political campaigns conducted by Soviet authorities in Ternopil Oblast districts encounter hidden resistance from a certain part of the rural population that has fallen under bandit influence, and open resistance, including armed uprisings from the bandits,” the brigade commander reported. According to him, the organization of collective farms met the greatest resistance from Ternopil Oblast’s population.

In this region, UPA detachments and underground combat units in January-May 1945 destroyed collective farm property and agricultural machinery, conducted sabotage on communications: undermining railway tracks, destroying telephone-telegraph poles; and attacked Soviet-party activists. There were still isolated attacks on the Polish population, such as in the village of Rohachyn, Berezhany District, on April 14, where 30 people were killed.

In the territory served by the 19th Brigade (19 districts of Stanislav Oblast and 4 of Chernivtsi Oblast), the UPA and underground were most active in Voinylivskyi, Rohatynskyi, Tlumach, Horodenka, Obertyn, and Rozhniativ districts. In Perehinsk District on March 20, 1945, insurgents blew up two locomotives and the railway track at the 25th kilometer of the railway.

And on the night of April 10, a train was blown up on UPA mines laid at the 30th kilometer from Dolyna station, and 8 cars derailed. On April 5, during an attack by a detachment of the “Bii” company near the village of Humeniv, Voinylivskyi District, 8 Soviet administrators and party members were killed, including: the district executive committee chairman, 3rd secretary of the CP(b)U district committee, and 2nd secretary of the Komsomol district committee. Six others were taken by the insurgents. These were the most characteristic operations of the Ukrainian liberation movement, according to the 19th Rifle Brigade headquarters data.

From the 17th Brigade’s report, we learn that the 207th and 209th rifle battalions were seconded by one company each to Poland, where they ensured the resettlement of Ukrainians from the Kholm region and Podlasie to the Ukrainian SSR. There, they had skirmishes with Home Army detachments (more precisely, its successors, since the Home Army was officially disbanded in early 1945).

From the reports, one can learn about the tactics of the Internal Troops NKVD deployment against the Ukrainian liberation movement. Thus, the operational-combat activities of Internal Troops units were conducted in close contact with NKVD and NKGB organs: plans for measures to liquidate the nationalist underground were drawn up jointly with the NKVD and NKGB, and all operations to combat “banditry” were conducted based on data from state security organs, as well as data obtained by officers during interrogations of detained liberation movement participants and military intelligence.

Brigade commanders noted changes in UPA detachment tactics, which forced them to correspondingly adjust their own troops’ tactics. In this regard, some brigades’ reporting divides the reporting period into two stages (which had different durations in different localities):

1. open struggle against numerous and large UPA detachments
2. struggle against small insurgent formations and OUN combat units dispersed among settlements, forest massifs, and Carpathian foothills.

At the first stage, Soviet troops employed tactics of conducting operations with entire military units through continuous sweeping of large territories. The second stage required transitioning to deploying brigades and regiments in small garrisons of platoon-company strength and allocating small raiding detachments to search for insurgent detachments and combat units. For example, according to an order from the Internal Troops Ukrainian District chief, General Mykhailo Marchenkov, the 20th Rifle Brigade in June 1945 transitioned to the method of establishing company garrisons, and in the end, outposts no larger than a platoon (20-30 soldiers). In parallel, special raiding detachments of 25-30 people were sent out to search for and liquidate UPA subdivisions.

For instance, the 24th Brigade in Rivne Oblast changed counter-insurgency methods 5 times during the year:

• January-February — method of sweeping localities, general military operations by brigade forces;
• March-April — method of prolonged blockading of districts affected by insurgent movement, with their subsequent thorough sweeping. Transition to nighttime actions by small detachments.
• May-June — widespread use of combat actions at night (night detachments, ambushes, observation posts, etc.). Widespread use of combat actions by small subdivisions, up to platoon inclusive. Reduction of general military operations by brigade forces — creation of mobile raiding detachments in battalions and cavalry platoons.
• July-August — combat actions by small garrisons and raiding detachments. Each garrison was given a concrete combat task to liquidate a specific UPA or OUN detachment.
• September-October — reduction of small garrisons, creation of company garrisons, general military operations from 1 to 2 battalions based on NKVD and NKGB organ data.

The section of reports about each brigade’s (regiment’s) operational-combat activities is necessarily accompanied by statistical data on the number of liberation movement actions (“bandit manifestations”), the number of insurgents killed, wounded, captured, and those who came forward voluntarily. I recommend comparing figures of killed enemies with data on captured trophies, which usually follow. Almost always, the number of captured “barrels” is several times lower than the number of killed and captured insurgents, which cannot help but lead to thoughts about strong exaggerations by the Chekists of their results. Especially against the background of their own losses, which are significantly smaller.

For example, the 21st Brigade submitted such general combat results for a year and a half of operations in Rivne and Ternopil oblasts:

insurgents killed 3,057; captured 4,569; voluntarily surrendered 806; weapons captured — only 1,839 units.

And this with their own losses of 78 killed and 134 wounded soldiers.

Each brigade or regiment provided a list of UPA detachments and OUN combat units and their leaders who operated against them in the corresponding territory. For instance, in the 19th Rifle Brigade’s zone of responsibility, 7 insurgent groups were on operational record, numbering 1,130 registered participants: the “Skazheni” and “Zhuravli” kurins, the “Dovbush” kurin (kurin commander — “Iskra”) and “Knysh,” the “Skuba” kurin, as well as separate companies “Bii,” “Koss,” 84 Security Service (SB) OUN combat units (1,252 participants), and 7 self-defense groups (382 participants).

Information about the liquidation of “bandit groups” by units of the 17th Rifle Brigade for the period from July 23 to September 10, 1945

However, it should be kept in mind that these lists may be incomplete, as they concerned only those who were registered with the corresponding NKVD or NKGB organ. Moreover, the data itself was often outdated or unreliable, and the spelling of insurgent pseudonyms in Russian-language documents was distorted.

In sections about operational-combat activity results, we also find statistics on Chekist combat and non-combat losses, descriptions of the most characteristic “bandit manifestations,” and lists of the most important UPA and OUN participants who were killed or captured during operations by the corresponding Internal Troops brigade.

For example, the 20th Brigade reported that during March 27, 1944 — August 30, 1945, during anti-insurgent operations in Rivne Oblast and Southern Ternopil Oblast, the following were killed:

UPA-North Commander Dmytro Kliachkivskyi-“Klym Savur” (February 12, 1945); rear area commandant of the “Zahrava” military district Hryhorii Rybak-“Yurko” (May 1944) district communications chief “Tereshko”; head of the “Zalizna Piata” sabotage group “Karmeliuk”; UPA organizational referent “Morozenko”; detachment leader “Honta”; SB commandant “Chuprynka”; district SB commandant “Mykola”; district political referent “Panas”; “UPA colonel” “Harmash”; “UPA colonel” “Kryvonis”; district SB commandant, also leader of the “Mamai” detachment (possibly referring to the SB referent of Dubno supra-district, who died in June 1945) and his deputy “Baida”; company commander of Petro Oliinyk-“Enei’s” headquarters “Chornyi”; district political referents “Zhyrafa” and “Yastrub”; company commander “Burlachenko” (probably Roman Shushkevych from UPA-South); company commander “Orel”; organizational-mobilization referent “Morozenko” and others.

Were captured:

Economic officer of UPA groups No. 33 formation headquarters Volodymyr Haskevych-“Karyi” (February 6, 1945); Colonel of the UNR Army Mykhailo Pavlovskyi, who was field chaplain of the UPA “Zahrava” group headquarters; Ukrainian Red Cross referent — hospital head “Myroslavna”; SB judge “Zub”; district SB commandant “Zhuts”; leader of the oblast OUN provid “Yasnyi”.

And the 169th Rifle Regiment for the summer period of 1945 claimed the defeat of 10 UPA detachments and OUN combat units, as well as the killing in battle of company commander “Boz,” district OUN leader “Krylach,” SB referent of Manevychi District, Volyn Oblast, Kharyton Nykytiuk-“Madiar” (5.06.1945), and the capture of deputy commander of UPA-North groups No. 33 formation Mykola Pavlovych-“Yavorenko” (19.08.1945).

Therefore, correlating data on killed and captured insurgents with other sources (UPA and OUN documentation, NKVD-NKGB archival-investigative cases, etc.) can clarify the circumstances of death or captivity of a considerable number of middle and upper-level liberation movement leaders.

By the way, among those killed by soldiers of the 20th Brigade is mentioned “first deputy commander of the UPA Southern Group Petro Oliinyk-‘Enei’ — ‘Doks,’ also known as colonel ‘Vyr’ and ‘Doroshenko.'” However, this is false data — company commander Semen Kotyk-“Doks” (“Vyr”) was still alive and successfully commanded the “Kholodnyi Yar” UPA-South formation until his death in December 1945. Such “false trails” should always be kept in mind when working with Soviet documents.

Reporting on the availability of automotive and horse-drawn transport, weapons and ammunition, and other property allows us to conclude that in 1945, the Internal Troops NKVD were light motorized infantry formations. Each unit had several 45mm anti-tank guns, a battalion of 82mm, and a company of 50mm mortars. The rest consisted of infantry weapons: rifles, submachine guns, light and heavy machine guns, and anti-tank rifles.

Rifle brigades and regiments were equipped with trucks, motorcycles, and horse-drawn transport; the cavalry regiment, as expected, moved on horses and tachankas. However, by 1945, the automotive equipment in units was already heavily worn and required constant repairs. There was often a lack of fuel. Sometimes this was a critical problem, since, as the 24th Brigade commander reported, 80% of operational time is spent overcoming space marches.

An impression of the psychological atmosphere in the punitive troops can be formed from the section on the moral-political state and state of military discipline of the corresponding unit’s personnel. Even though most commanders assured that their subordinates were “faithful to the cause of Lenin-Stalin and the defense of the socialist Motherland,” and their general moral-political state was quite healthy, they had to acknowledge the presence of violations of “revolutionary legality” (that is, military and service crimes), looting, drunkenness, and immoral acts.

For example, in the 21st Internal Troops Brigade, the number of offenses during the 1st quarter of 1945 did not decrease but increased, despite a series of measures by the political department to strengthen discipline. Moreover, in percentage terms, the brigade’s officer corps committed three times more offenses than rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants.

According to the brigade commander’s conclusion, in most cases, various extraordinary incidents and other immoral phenomena are committed by military personnel while drunk or on the grounds of drunkenness.

For example: “1. Lieutenant of the 226th Separate Rifle Battalion Uiutov on 6.08.1945, while performing official duties, got drunk, beat innocent local citizens, including the district executive committee secretary. 2. Senior Lieutenant of the 230th Separate Rifle Battalion, Tonkoshkurov, and Sergeant Major of the same battalion, Shaliuhin, got drunk and lost their personal weapons. 3. Senior Lieutenant of the 226th Separate Rifle Battalion, deputy battalion commander for drill affairs, Petrov, being intoxicated, on 3.09.1945, caused a scandal in the battalion officers’ dining room. 4. Junior Sergeant of the separate supply battalion Kuplennyi and Red Army soldier of the 228th Separate Rifle Battalion Zakharchenko in July 1945, on 1.07.1945, decided to drink, went AWOL from the unit to the city of Terebovlia, got drunk, and committed armed robbery of a resident of the village of Plebanivka. Junior Sergeant Kuplennyi and Red Army soldier Zakharchenko were handed over to the Military Tribunal.”

The same drunkenness was mostly the cause of venereal diseases among Soviet military personnel.

Predominantly, Internal Troops unit commanders considered the level of discipline of their subordinates to be low. “The political-moral state and discipline in the regiment at present still do not fully meet all requirements,” reported, for example, the commander of the 18th NKVD Cavalry Regiment.

In the corresponding sections of reports are extensive reflections by unit commanders on the reasons for this state of affairs and proposals for improving discipline. In the same place, the researcher will find statistics on military offenses, the number of those convicted by military tribunal, and a description of disciplinary practice.

The documents contain detailed information about the state of personnel in Internal Troops units, the completeness of rank-and-file and officer corps, the level of their qualification and training, the number of those awarded state decorations, etc. I won’t discover America if I say that all commanders complained about the shortage of military personnel of all categories. This was natural in wartime conditions.

The quality of command staff can be judged from such a characterization of the 169th Rifle Regiment headquarters: “The regiment’s officer corps consists predominantly of military personnel who were assigned officer ranks during the Patriotic War after passing short-term courses, as well as those who arrived from the reserve. The majority of the officer corps has insufficient military training and requires retraining.” This regiment was supposed to have 1,670 people on staff, although 1,418 were listed. An unusual detail: among them, 18 girls served in rifleman positions.

In conclusion, Volume 111 of the Internal Troops NKVD Ukrainian District Archive offers not just a collection of dry bureaucratic papers, but analytical documentation that gives a comprehensive picture of the course of the liberation struggle in 1945 from the perspective of its direct adversary.

Ukrainian-language version of the article